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61

TALKING PAPER

on

JCS RECOMMENDATIONS RE POST-CUBA ACTIONS

- . Within past 24 hours JCS have addressed problems of post-Cuba actions in following areas:
- Points to be considered in current negotiations
  - Measures to sustain U.S. initiative and deterrent posture
  - UN inspection of Soviet offensive weapons withdrawal
- . Memo to Sec Def on current negotiations recommended U.S. insist on certain conditions for terms of agreement on removal of Soviet offensive capability from Cuba, namely,
- elimination of all Soviet and Bloc offensive weapons, including bombers
  - immediate cessation of all missile site and bomber base construction
  - right of blockade until U.S. satisfied threat is removed
  - U.S. aerial surveillance
  - UN inspection teams limited to technically qualified non-Bloc personnel
  - U.S. refusal to enter any agreement restricting right of Cuban people wherever they may be to determine for themselves Cuba's political future.
- . Item to sustain U.S. initiative, etc., (not yet approved by JCS) contains Memo to Sec Def which raises following points:
- Immediate aftermath of crisis is a most critical

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- could be a decisive turning point in cold war, or merely temporary detente
- Soviet missile buildup evidence of failure of U.S. deterrence
  - . in disregard of U.S. warnings
  - . Soviets miscalculated U.S. resolve
  - . required intensive and costly politico-military actions to convince them.
- We proved them wrong; now must insure they do not misread our determination again
- Ultimate outcome could be net loss or gain, depending in large part on what we do in immediate future
- To insure long-term gain, U.S. must
  - . maintain initiative
  - . take further actions to give continuing effect to recent demonstration of resolve.
- To this end JCS recommends U.S. take certain measures which give promise of immediate and successful results. Among them:
  - . military aid to India
  - . revise U.S./French nuclear policy in direction of cooperation
  - . full U.S. participation in CEMTO
  - . continue and expand nuclear test program
  - . effect permanent improvement of STRICOM forces.
- . The JCS are reviewing and commenting on a proposed State message to the USUN outlining suggestions regarding UN inspection procedures during and after dismantling and withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons. The proposed message has added a large number of questions related to

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Authority Jesta 11/18/1979  
By 5229 NARS, Date 6/22/1979

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principle as well as the technical and mechanical competence of the UN to accomplish this surveillance.

Questions of the following type are being posed within the Joint Staff:

- What measures in this plan will prevent, or even restrict the normal and expected Communist tactic of systematic delay in carrying out substantive measures of inspection?
- What assurance will the U.S. have as to the technical competence of the inspectors to be used? Is not some statement regarding U.S. satisfaction regarding the technical competence of the inspection personnel a requirement?
- Are we talking of inspecting ship cargoes only, or will we have provisions to inspect Air Cargoes?
- Is the inspection scheme based on the principle that there must be 100% assurance that no nuclear delivery capability remains in Cuba?
- What offensive actions can be taken if inspection is conducted in part and a disagreement and/or impasse results?
- How will inspectors verify the contents of sealed containers? Will they take the Soviets' word, or will they break the seals and physically inspect?
- American shipping firms have stated that almost anything can be concealed aboard ship if adequate time is available and proper planning is accomplished. Are UN inspection teams equipped to cope with professional "smugglers"?
- Can inspectors distinguish between offensive weapons

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- American shipping firms have stated that almost anything can be concealed aboard ship if adequate time is available and proper planning is accomplished. Are US inspection teams equipped to cope with professional "smugglers"?
- Can inspectors distinguish between offensive weapon components and other non-offensive weapon components (SAs, jet fighter engines, etc.)?

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-- Even if Soviets furnish inventory, shouldn't UN  
inspection force verify by physical check?